Case Number

LCA 6897/14

Date Decided

12-9-2015

Decision Type

Appellate

Document Type

Full Opinion

Abstract

The District Court certified the application of Kolech – Religious Women’s Forum Organization (hereinafter: Kolech) to bring a class action against the radio station Kol BaRamah Ltd. (hereinafter: the radio station), holding that the declared policy adopted by the radio station in the years 2009-2011, whereby women could not be heard on the station’s broadcasts, constituted prohibited discrimination under the Prohibition against Discrimination in Products, Services and Entry to Places of Entertainment and Public Places Law, 5761-2000 (hereinafter: Prohibition against Discrimination Law). (It should be noted that the change in the management of the radio station as of the year 2011 was the result of a regulatory and monitoring process instituted by the Second Authority). Hence this Application for Leave to Appeal, which was heard as an appeal, at the center of which lie the following questions: Does the policy of the radio station, according to which women are not heard on its broadcasts, constitute cause for bringing a class action? Under what conditions is an “organization” authorized to bring such an action?

The Supreme Court (per Justice Y. Danziger, Justices E. Hayut and D. Barak-Erez concurring) dismissed the appeal, except for comments on the question of quantification of damages and subject to the determination that in adjudicating the case, the District Court will not address violations that occurred in the period after the beginning of the process of regulation, for the following reasons:

After a short discussion of the general phenomenon of exclusion of women from the public domain, and after the Supreme Court expressed its feeling of disgust and revulsion at the existence of this phenomenon in those cases in which it amounts to prohibited discrimination, and after setting the parameters of the discussion as a class action on grounds of discrimination, the Court proceeded to examine the central questions presented by the case. The Court concluded that there were no grounds to intervene in the majority of the determinations of the District Court or in its conclusion that the said action is suitable for adjudication as a class action, both in its substance and in the manner in which it was submitted. In particular, no grounds were found for intervening in the two central determinations according to which Kolech is an organization that is eligible to bring a class action by virtue of section 4(a)(3) of the Class Actions Law, and there is prima facie cause for bringing a class action under the provisions of sec. 3(a) of the Class Action Law and item 7 of the Second Appendix to that Law.

Sec. 4(a)(3) of the Law states that an “organization” (within the meaning of the definitions section of the Law) may bring a class action, provided that the action addresses an area that is among its public purposes, and provided that it would be difficult to submit the application on behalf of a plaintiff who has a personal cause of action. In the opinion of Justice Danziger, narrow, cautious interpretation should normally be adopted in removing the procedural barriers that the above sec. 4(a)(3) places before organizations that wish to submit an application for certification of a class action, out of concern that lack of caution in this regard is liable to encourage the phenomenon of bringing baseless actions, and even affect cases in which there would not seem to be any difficulty in bringing the action in the names of plaintiffs with personal causes of action.

An organization seeking to bring a class action in place of a plaintiff with a personal cause of action must meet the following cumulative conditions: first, the organization must prove that it complies with the conditions of sec. 2 of the Class Action Law, which include proving that it is an active, recognized organization, that regularly and actually operates, and has been doing so for at least a year, and that the purpose of its activity is clearly a public purpose; secondly, the organization must prove that the lawsuit is within the area of one of its public purposes; thirdly, the organization must prove that a difficulty exists in submitting the application in the name of a person with a personal cause of action. The term “difficult” should be examined in accordance with the case and its circumstances, and with regard to several indicators, among them a lack of financial means among potential plaintiffs; areas or situations in which the direct victims are not aware of the fact of the harm done to them due to gaps in knowledge or an inability to comprehend the harm; and cultural barriers which make it difficult to find a plaintiff with a personal cause of action. All these are relevant to situations characterized by the existence of a cultural gap that deters plaintiffs with a personal cause of action from turning to the courts, and does not constitute a closed list. As a rule, proving this condition will require that evidence be presented showing that the organization acted with “due diligence” to locate a plaintiff with a personal cause of action, in both the quantitative and the qualitative sense, but subject to the possibility of there being exceptional situations in which the court will be satisfied that there is an inherent difficulty, or that there are special, known and convincing data arising from the circumstances of the case that would suffice to show a difficulty in finding a plaintiff with a personal cause of action.

As the District Court determined, Kolech – whose purpose is promoting the status of women in the religious community and in Israeli society – complies with the above conditions, and it is therefore a “qualified organization” for the purpose of bringing a class action. The main reason supporting the conclusion that it was difficult to find a plaintiff with a personal cause of action in the present case is that there is a reluctance on the part of ultra-Orthodox women to place themselves at the forefront of the struggle to increase gender equality in the ultra-Orthodox community, for fear of harm to their position in the community. In this regard, the cultural aspect carries great weight, and it is sufficient to support the concern that had Kolech not submitted the application for certification of the class action, it would not have been submitted at all. The Court added that even had it been possible to locate a plaintiff with a personal cause of action who could have submitted the application herself, it would not have been right in the circumstances to order that the request be denied or dismissed in limine, but at most, to order that the organization be replaced by that plaintiff.

As for the cause of action, the Court decided that the Prohibition against Discrimination Law applies in the circumstances of the case. As the District Court determined, the prohibition against discrimination in the provision of a “public service” refers not only to access to the broadcasts of the radio station, but to all the services that the station provides to listeners, including the possibility of listeners participating in programs. Denying this possibility to women because they are women – provided such denial is proved – is certainly liable to amount to discrimination to which the Prohibition against Discrimination Law applies. Pursuant to this, the Court dismissed the argument of the radio station that gender distinction is necessitated by the traditional religious nature of the radio station and is due to the halakhic position of the station’s rabbinical committee, and therefore there is no discrimination, or alternatively, that the exceptions specified in the Prohibition against Discrimination Law apply such that it is not possible to sue the station for its policy. The Supreme Court held that the policy adopted by the radio station does, indeed, constitute discrimination under sec. 3(a) of the Law, and that there are no grounds for applying the exceptions prescribed in secs. 3(d)(1) and 3(d)(3) of the Law, according to which it will not be considered discrimination where “the action is necessitated by the character or nature of the product” and that it is possible to maintain “separate frameworks for men or women, as long as this separation is justified”. In this context, the Court determined that in order for either of the two above exceptions to apply, it must be proven that the religious norm is indeed binding, or at least justifies adopting the differential attitude to women. In the present case, it cannot be said that religious practice mandates or justifies application of the exceptions in the Prohibition against Discrimination Law, particularly when the halakhic opinion upon which the station relies – that of the late Rabbi Ovadia Yosef – stated specifically that the prohibition on allowing women’s voices to be heard is not in the category of a halakhic prohibition, but rather, in the category of “enhancing a precept” [hidur mitzvah]. Moreover, the facts in the present case show that the cultural and the religious character of the radio station was preserved even after the said practice of excluding women from the broadcasts of the station was stopped in the framework of the regulatory process, and what is more, the scope of the activity of the station actually continues to grow. Moreover, the exception specified in sec. 3(d)(3) of the Law does not apparently apply in our case, inter alia, for the reason that it refers to the existence of “separate frameworks” for men and women, i.e., an arrangement of separation. In our case, there was no arrangement of separation but an arrangement that apparently prevented women, and only women, from participating in the broadcasts of the radio station.

Further, no cause was found for intervening in the determinations of the District Court with respect to the immunity provided in sec. 6 of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance.

With respect to harm and calculating the compensation, even though the Court accepted some of the arguments raised by the radio station regarding the harm, it was of the opinion that this element was proved by Kolech at the required prima facie level for this stage of the proceedings, and therefore there is no reason to depart from the final conclusion of the District Court that it had been proven to the required extent that the members of the class incurred harm due to the policy of the station. At the same time, the Court decided to intervene in certain determinations of the District Court in this context, such as the determination regarding the possibility of awarding damages in the suit “without proof of harm”. The Court held that it was not possible to award damages without proof of harm in the circumstances of the case, notwithstanding the possibility of doing so under the Prohibition against Discrimination Law in matters other than a class action. A second comment referred to the matter of the relief that was sought – NIS 104,000,000. It was noted that the case raised questions concerning the appropriate method of calculation of the compensation in the circumstances of the case.

No grounds were found for intervening in the determination of the District Court whereby a common question existed in respect of all the members of the class, i.e., “whether the station acted in a prohibited discriminatory manner against the members of the class in that it prevented women from being heard on air from the time it began operating and until today, Nov. 6, 2011…”; according to the Court, the focus on the issue of the common question should be on the tortious conduct of the radio station during the period of the declared policy. This question is one that stands at the center of the action. The District Court should not address questions that relate to the period of time after the commencement of the regulatory process, in the course of which the two concrete violations occurred. The Supreme Court also found no grounds to intervene in the determination that there is a “reasonable possibility” that the above question will be decided in favor of members of the class.

Neither was reason found to intervene in the determination of the District Court that a class action is the suitable means of conducting the said dispute, insofar as the period prior to the beginning of the regulatory process is concerned. As opposed to this, the Court held that with respect to the period of the particular instances of violation, a class action is not necessarily the most efficient way of conducting the particular dispute, and it is preferable that it be adjudicated in the framework of personal actions brought by the women who were allegedly harmed, to the extent that they wish to do so.

Furthermore, the conditions laid down in secs. 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(4) were met. There is reasonable basis to assume that the interests of all members of the class will be represented and conducted in an appropriate manner and in good faith.

Consequently, it was ruled that the decision of the District Court will stand, except for any changes necessitated by what has been said above.

Justices E. Hayut and D. Barak-Erez concurred with the above and added comments, inter alia, regarding procedural questions related to class actions being brought by means of an organization, and on the substantive issue of the exclusion of women, including reference to an additional aspect relating to the “location” of the present case on the private-public continuum.

Keywords

Civil Procedure -- Class action, Communications, Torts -- Discrimination, Jewish Law -- Women

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