Case Number

HCJ 1893/11

Date Decided

8-30-2015

Decision Type

Original

Document Type

Full Opinion

Abstract

[This abstract is not part of the Court's opinion and is provided for the reader's convenience. It has been translated from a Hebrew version prepared by Nevo Press Ltd. and is used with its kind permission.]

Facts: The petitions concerned the interpretation of section 10 (3) of Schedule Two of the Class Actions Law, which restricts the possibility of instituting a class action in labor law in the case of a “suit by an worker who is subject to a collective agreement that regulates the terms of his employment, and the employer of that worker, or trade association of which it is a member, is a party to that collective agreement.” The petitions arose in light of decisions of the National Labor Court rendered in a number of cases litigated before it. The issue was whether this exception applied to every case in which a worker is subject to a collective agreement to which the employer, or the trade association, is a party, or whether it could be understood as not applying to such situations if neither collective nor legal action had been initiated to redress the breach of workers’ rights addressed by the class action.

Held: The High Court of Justice (per Justice D. Barak-Erez, Justices H. Melcer and Z. Zylbertal concurring) denied the petitions, holding that the National Labor Court had struck a proper balance among the relevant considerations in LabA 629/07 in re Viron, in LabA 132/10 in re Buskilla, and in LabA 53348-01-12 in re Yashiev. However, the Court decided to clarify the applicability of the exception under section 10 (3) of Schedule Two in regard to enforcement agreements, inter alia, in light of certain differences in their treatment in Buskilla and Yashiev.

Based upon the objectives of the specific law and considerations peculiar to the Israeli labor market, the Court held that the law does not categorically prevent every request to certify a class action by workers in a workplace subject to a collective agreement. In cases in which the collective agreement does not comprise a mechanism for the monitoring or enforcement of workers’ rights, and where the labor union is non-functional, i.e., is not an organization that takes practical steps for the enforcement of workers’ rights, then section 10 (3) will not bar a request to certify a class action. This conclusion approves the basic approach adopted in the Viron case, which has since served as the basis for the Labor Court’s decisions in other cases. In such cases, the Labor Court’s discretion does not extend to the question whether the exception under section 10 (3) is met, but only to the existence of the other conditions established under section 8 of the Class Actions Law for the purpose of certifying such a suit.

In light of the above, the Court held that when a request for the certification of a class action suit is submitted, the questions that the Labor Court will have to address will be whether the labor union is acting to advance the workers’ rights, and whether that action provides an effective means for the enforcement of the claimed rights. Such action need not be optimal, but it must be actual and not a mere “show”.

The Court then addressed, in greater detail, the cases in which the activity of a labor union would be deemed to constitute actual involvement in labor relations. Among other things, it was held that the Labor Court should consider the general circumstances of the case, inter alia, the defining characteristics of the relevant field; the existence or absence of systematic breaches of rights; the type of rights infringed; the conduct of the labor union (both in regard to the infringed rights and in general); the availability of the labor union for addressing individual complaints of workers; the general functioning of the labor union in protecting workers’ rights; the labor union’s ability to bring about the actual enforcement of workers’ rights, such that they receive what the employers owe them; as well as the labor union’s ability to redress past infringements of rights, and not act merely prospectively.

In a unionized workplace, a worker seeking to initiate a class action must show that he first sought the assistance of the labor union before seeking certification of the suit. In the opinion of Justice Barak-Erez, such a request for assistance must be for the enforcement of the personal rights of the worker. It must be a focused request for the enforcement of concrete rights, as opposed to some general request. Serving formal notice upon the labor union or informing it of the intent to initiate of a class action is not a precondition for filing a class action. The appropriate response time of the labor union can be considered by the labor court in accordance with the specific circumstances of each case.

Keywords

Labor -- Class Action, Labor -- Collective Agreement, Labor -- Unions

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