Publication Date

4-2003

Journal

George Washington Law Review

Abstract

The article critiques the argument by Posner and Vermeule that legislative entrenchment—where a legislature passes laws that future legislatures cannot repeal without special procedures—is constitutionally permissible and normatively attractive. The author, Stewart E. Sterk, contends that their argument is flawed because it fails to address whether courts should enforce such entrenched laws, rendering their case legally and normatively incoherent. Sterk argues that entrenchment undermines democratic principles by allowing one legislature to bind future legislatures, potentially leading to intergenerational inequity and abuse by special interest groups. He advocates for mechanisms allowing future legislatures to adjust laws as needed, ensuring flexibility and fairness.

Volume

71

Issue

2

First Page

231

Last Page

254

Publisher

The George Washington University Law School

Disciplines

Jurisprudence | Law | Legislation

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