The Economics of Auctioning and Related Regulatory Issues: The Economic Viability of the Auction Provision of the Bill and Alternatives for Direct-to-Home Licenses

Authors

• Maria Vagliasindi, University of Edinburgh, Scotland
• Pietro A. Vagliasindi, University of Pisa, Italy

Abstract

The article evaluates the use of auctioning as a regulatory tool for awarding licenses in natural monopoly industries, particularly focusing on broadcasting and telecommunications. It examines the economic viability of franchise bidding for Direct-to-Home (DTH) licenses in India and compares it to spectrum auctions in the U.S. The analysis highlights the potential efficiency of auctioning in promoting competition and reducing rents but also identifies significant challenges, including delays, design complexities, and theoretical limitations.

Disciplines

Antitrust and Trade Regulation | Communications Law | Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law | Law | Law and Economics

Recommended Citation

Maria Vagliasindi & Pietro A. Vagliasindi, The Economics of Auctioning and Related Regulatory Issues: The Economic Viability of the Auction Provision of the Bill and Alternatives for Direct-to-Home Licenses, 5 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 467 (1997).
Available at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/cjicl/vol5/iss2/9