Deregulating the Inadequate Basel Accords: Future-Proofing Financial Regulations in an Age of Global Crises

Authors

• Ivan Chaykovskiy, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

Abstract

The Basel Accords, despite their intent to enhance financial stability, are fundamentally flawed due to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's lack of formal legal enforcement authority. This limitation renders the Accords ineffective in addressing global financial crises, as their success depends on consistent implementation and compliance across jurisdictions. The note argues that the Committee must be restructured to include a broader membership and gain enforcement powers to create a more robust regulatory framework. Without such reforms, the Accords will continue to fail in preventing future financial meltdowns.

Disciplines

Banking and Finance Law | Evidence | Law | Legal History

Recommended Citation

Ivan Chaykovskiy, Deregulating the Inadequate Basel Accords: Future-Proofing Financial Regulations in an Age of Global Crises, 25 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 77 (2016).
Available at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/cjicl/vol25/iss1/5