Publication Date
10-1999
Journal
Notre Dame Law Review
Abstract
The article critically examines the evolution of executive compensation, particularly the shift from traditional pay structures to performance-based systems, and argues that this shift has not resolved the underlying issues of excessive pay and misaligned incentives. Instead, it has introduced new conflicts of interest and inefficiencies. The author proposes a regulatory solution—a deductibility cap on executive pay—to curb excessive compensation and better align executive incentives with shareholder interests.
Volume
75
Issue
1
First Page
271
Last Page
308
Publisher
Notre Dame Law School
Disciplines
Business Organizations Law | Labor and Employment Law | Law | Taxation-Transnational
Recommended Citation
Charles M. Yablon,
Bonus Questions--Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for Performance,
75
Notre Dame L. Rev.
271
(1999).
https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/650
Included in
Business Organizations Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, Taxation-Transnational Commons
