Publication Date
5-1997
Journal
Columbia Law Review
Abstract
In recent years, both the Supreme Court and the Congress have made much of the rapid pace of technological change within the telecommunications industry. In passing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, for example, Congressional leaders described these changes in almost millennial terms, predicting that "convergence" of communications technologies would beget a new regulatory world in which telecommunications technologies would no longer be regulated in a piece-mea4 media-specific fashion, but rather as part of a unified, coherent scheme. The Supreme Court, likewise, has portrayed changes in telecommunications technology as reason to move its First Amendment jurisprudence away from media-specific categories and to ponder other sweeping doctrinal changes.
In this Essay, Professors Price and Duffy examine the ways in which Congress and the Court have really accommodated, and exploited, changes in telecommunications technology and weigh these institutions' actual achievements against their rhetoric. They first examine the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and argue that, for all the revolutionary language that passed the lips of many in Congress, the Act largely retains the rigid, category-specific approach of earlier telecommunications legislation. In contrast, the Justices of the Supreme Court, though claiming to proceed with caution and restraint, seem to be seizing on technological change in telecommunications to advance far more fundamental changes in established First Amendment law. Nevertheless, the changes being advanced-albeit very significant deviations from established doctrine-still have strong roots in all that has gone before. Technological change has provided the Justices with an opportunity to extend revered doctrines, such as public forum and public subsidy law, into new areas, and to reopen old jurisprudential debates, such as the ancient rules-versus-standards controversy, with predictable alliances. In both Congress and the Court, the authors conclude, the decisionmakers involved have often used technological changes as an excuse-a camouflage-for advancing agendas that have little necessary connection with those changes and that indeed may have far more in common with the past.
Volume
97
Issue
4
First Page
976
Last Page
1015
Publisher
Columbia Law School
Disciplines
Law | Law and Economics
Recommended Citation
Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy,
Technological Change and Doctrinal Persistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress and the Court,
97
Colum. L. Rev.
976
(1997).
https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/1572

Comments
Symposium: Telecommunications Law: Unscrambling the Signals, Unbundling the Law