Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States: Paradoxes and Contrasts

Publication Date

10-2004

Journal

International Journal of Constitutional Law

Abstract

The article examines the differences in constitutional adjudication between the United States and Europe, arguing that the U.S. system, rooted in common law and case-by-case decision-making, is more susceptible to perceptions of politicization compared to Europe's abstract, ex ante approach. While the U.S. Supreme Court operates within a framework of unpredictability and deep value disagreements, European constitutional courts, such as those in Germany and France, benefit from greater consensus on fundamental values and structural safeguards that mitigate legitimacy crises. The article highlights how these differences shape the role of constitutional adjudication in each system and its perceived legitimacy.

Volume

2

Issue

4

First Page

633

Last Page

668

Publisher

Oxford University Press

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/2.4.633

Disciplines

Constitutional Law | Jurisprudence | Law

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