Publication Date

7-2006

Journal

University of Miami Law Review

Abstract

The article critically examines Ronald Dworkin's jurisprudence, particularly his theory of right answers, and defends it against critiques that his approach to law and language creates an unbridgeable gap between theory and practice. Dworkin's central argument is that law has an essence that judges must discover through reflective equilibrium, emphasizing the incommensurability between the judge's act and the symbolic order of law. While critics argue that this approach leads to nihilism, Dworkin counters by asserting that conventionalists are contradictory and that justice, as a decision, necessarily transgresses the domain of law.

Volume

60

Issue

4

First Page

505

Last Page

530

Publisher

University of Miami School of Law

Disciplines

Judges | Jurisprudence | Law | Law and Society

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