Publication Date

10-1994

Journal

Columbia Law Review

Abstract

The article argues that John Rawls's concept of the person undergoes a significant shift between A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, necessitating a corresponding change in jurisprudence. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls employs a "correlative jurisprudence," where law is determinate, complete, and judges merely apply existing law. This approach is tied to a narrow, passive view of personality, treating individuals as mere loci of liberty and rights. In contrast, Political Liberalism presents a dynamic, contradictory conception of the person as a union of moral capacity and a determinate conception of the good. This shift, the article contends, requires abandoning correlative jurisprudence for a "jurisprudence of right," where persons actively shape law and their own existence through recognition and self-expression.

Volume

94

Issue

6

First Page

1828

Last Page

1841

Publisher

Columbia Law School

Disciplines

Constitutional Law | Human Rights Law | Jurisprudence | Law

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