Publication Date
1994
Journal
Capital University Law Review
Abstract
The article critiques the use of Chapter 11 bankruptcy for single asset real estate cases, arguing that the doctrine of artificial impairment undermines the purpose of Chapter 11 by allowing creditors to bypass valuation and unfairly dismiss cases without merit. It contends that the repeal of section 1124(3) in 1994 has created uncertainty about the viability of artificial impairment as a tactic, while courts and creditors continue to grapple with the classification and treatment of claims in these cases.
Volume
23
Issue
2
First Page
339
Last Page
378
Publisher
Capital University Law School
Disciplines
Bankruptcy Law | Law
Recommended Citation
David G. Carlson,
Artificial Impairment and the Single Asset Chapter 11 Case,
23
Cap. U. L. Rev.
339
(1994).
https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/1235