Publication Date
10-2025
Journal
Annual Review of Law and Social Science
Abstract
The Supreme Court has deliberately framed the law of constitutional torts as a balance between assuring redress for victims, deterring misconduct, and maintaining effective government services. Yet as the Supreme Court has shaped the contours of litigation against state and local actors (under 42 USC § 1983) and federal actors (under the Bivens doctrine), it has studiously ignored a growing body of empirical scholarship examining the ways law interacts with the behavior of police officers and other government actors. This review documents the Supreme Court's reliance on what could be charitably described as judicial intuition and its indifference to empirical evidence about such central questions as the volume and success of constitutional tort claims, the efficacy of qualified immunity, and the way the rules of tort liability shape the conduct of government officials.
Volume
21
First Page
379
Last Page
396
Publisher
Annual Reviews
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-061824-074804
Keywords
Section 1983, Monell doctrine, Bivens doctrine, qualified immunity, empirical legal studies
Disciplines
Civil Rights and Discrimination | Constitutional Law | Courts | Law | Law and Society | Public Law and Legal Theory
Recommended Citation
Joanna C. Schwartz, Alexander A. Reinert & James E. Pfander,
Empiricism and Constitutional Torts,
21
Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci.
379
(2025).
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-061824-074804
Included in
Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Law and Society Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons
