Cardozo Law Review
Abstract
The note examines the intersection of patent law and antitrust policy, particularly in the context of pharmaceutical drug competition. It argues that while antitrust enforcement is an effective solution to address "pay-for-delay" agreements, it is less suitable for resolving "product-hopping" issues. Instead, the article contends that closing regulatory loopholes in the Hatch-Waxman framework would be a more effective approach to curbing anticompetitive product-hopping practices. The analysis focuses on two key cases—Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. and Schneiderman v. Actavis LLC—to illustrate the legal and economic implications of these strategies.
Disciplines
Antitrust and Trade Regulation | Food and Drug Law | Intellectual Property Law | Law
Recommended Citation
Joseph Fielding,
From Pay-for-Delay to Product Hopping: The Limited Utility of Antitrust Law in the Pharmaceutical Industry,
38
Cardozo L. Rev.
1915
(2017).
Available at:
https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/clr/vol38/iss5/8
Included in
Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons