Cardozo Law Review
Abstract
Does legal pragmatism have anything at all to do with pragmatism? Both Thomas Grey and Richard Posner seem to suggest that in important respects the answer is no. Grey tells us that even a devout anti-pragmatist in matters ontological can endorse legal pragmatism, while Posner adds the converse, that pragmatic philosophy may at times impel a judge to decide cases like a formalist. These conclusions suggest that talk of legal pragmatism may simply be a pun on what philosophers take pragmatism to be. Lest this appear a far-fetched suggestion, remember that in philosophy the word "realism" often refers to the belief that abstract entities such as laws really exist, while in law "realism" refers to the opposite, to the belief that abstract entities such as laws don't exist. I'm not suggesting that legal pragmatism is the opposite of philosophical pragmatism, as legal realism is the opposite of philosophical realism; but if Grey is right, legal and philosophical pragmatism need have nothing whatever to do with each other.
Keywords
Jurisprudence, Legal Analysis and Writing, Law and Society, Legal History
Disciplines
Jurisprudence | Law | Law and Society | Legal History
Recommended Citation
David Luban,
What’s Pragmatic About Legal Pragmatism?,
18
Cardozo L. Rev.
43
(1996).
Available at:
https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/clr/vol18/iss1/5