Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution
Abstract
This Note will first discuss the history of the FCC's regulatory authority, including its prior allocations of spectrum and the power under which it has the authority to repurpose the 600 MHz spectrum band. Next, this Note will detail the procedures that will be used in the upcoming Incentive Auction, and explore the options posed to broadcasters. In particular, it will emphasize the viability of one option-the ability to channel share-as the most economically efficient use of spectrum in certain cases. This Note will then propose the inclusion of tiered dispute resolution clauses within channel-sharing arrangements to help preemptively resolve potential conflicts during the parties' long-standing relationship to ensure the continued transmission of both parties' programming. The conclusion will respectfully urge the FCC to further implement a regime in which broadcasters are able to freely enter into channelsharing arrangements after the auction's end at a time that encoding technologies make it feasible.
Disciplines
Communications Law | Dispute Resolution and Arbitration | Law
Recommended Citation
Daniel Spencer,
Can't We All Get What We Want?: The Use of Tiered Dispute Resolution as a Means of Sustaining Free Market Channel-Sharing Arrangements Resulting From The FCC's 2016 Incentive Auction,
18
Cardozo J. Conflict Resol.
931
(2017).
Available at:
https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/cjcr/vol18/iss3/16