A Solution to Holdouts in the National Football League: How Salary Arbitration Can Limit a Growing Problem

Authors

Roger Quiles, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

Abstract

This Note will explore the intricacies of Major League Baseball's salary arbitration system, as established in the league's CBA with the MLB Players' Association (hereinafter, "MLBPA"), in order to create a suitable and similar forum for the NFL. The MLB salary arbitration model is not perfectly transposed to the NFL, but can be slightly modified to reflect the differences between the sports. The primary difference is that the NFL establishes a salary cap that a team's payroll may not exceed, whereas MLB teams can carry as big of a payroll as they want. Though the salary cap raises several questions regarding salary arbitration rewards, this Note proposes that the existence of a cap is not so substantial as to prevent the NFL from adopting the MLB model of salary arbitration, and also offers viable alternatives to the current system. In practice, the NFL's salary cap system would curtail the increasingly excessive salaries that the MLB salary arbitration system has been said to cause in the MLB. This Note concludes that the application of the MLB salary arbitration system to the NFL is feasible, and would have a profound effect on limiting, if not eliminating, holdout players.

Disciplines

Dispute Resolution and Arbitration | Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law | Labor and Employment Law | Law

Recommended Citation

Roger Quiles, A Solution to Holdouts in the National Football League: How Salary Arbitration Can Limit a Growing Problem, 13 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 259 (2011).
Available at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/cjcr/vol13/iss1/11