A Concept of Shared Principles and the Constitutional Homogeneity in Europe: The Case of Subsidiarity

Authors

• Volker Roeben, University of Dundee

Abstract

The article explores the concept of subsidiarity as a shared legal principle in both the European Union (EU) and German law, focusing on its role in ensuring the accountability of central authority while safeguarding the autonomy of peripheral legislatures. It highlights the convergence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) on a rationale of legality, aimed at preventing central overreach into peripheral competences. Despite this alignment, the article notes divergent outcomes in the application of subsidiarity, with the FCC more frequently invalidating federal legislation compared to the CJEU's more restrained approach. The analysis underscores the importance of judicial review in maintaining the balance of competences between central and peripheral authorities.

Disciplines

Comparative and Foreign Law | Courts | Human Rights Law | International Law | Law | Law and Politics | President/Executive Department

Recommended Citation

Volker Roeben, A Concept of Shared Principles and the Constitutional Homogeneity in Europe: The Case of Subsidiarity, 4 Cardozo Int’l & Compar. L. Rev. 903 (2021).
Available at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/ciclr/vol4/iss3/4