Cardozo International & Comparative Law Review
Abstract
Investor-state arbitration was created with the hope of depoliticizing investment disputes. However, the adoption of the traditional party-appointment system, in which disputing parties play a direct role in the composition of the tribunal, is increasingly criticized. Many believe that party appointment is a tool ofpolitical influence over the arbitrators' interpretative space. Suggestions for reform of the system have proliferated. The most radical proposal currently on the table-the creation of a permanent investment court-would cause a paradigm shift in the selection of adjudicators, moving from a disputing party framework, to a treaty party context. This article analyzes different options to reduce political influence in the selection process and discusses their potential effectiveness. It concludes that proposed alternatives to the party-appointed regime can only help to mitigate, but never completely dispel, the risk ofpolitical contamination ofthe process through which investment adjudicators are selected.
Disciplines
Comparative and Foreign Law | Dispute Resolution and Arbitration | International Law | International Trade Law | Law | Law and Politics
Recommended Citation
Fernando D. Simões,
Can Investment Dispute Settlement Ever Be Depoliticized?,
4
Cardozo Int’l & Compar. L. Rev.
507
(2021).
Available at:
https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/ciclr/vol4/iss2/4
Included in
Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, International Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons