Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal
Abstract
When a pirated version of a copyrighted work is shared over the Internet, many online intermediaries may participate, exposing these firms to liability through legal concepts such as direct, contributory and vicarious infringement. Safe harbors largely shield intermediaries from "crippling liability" in return for cooperative action on infringing materials. Yet, digital piracy remains a problem. In this paper, we offer a simple economic model of safe harbor protection, demonstrating that de minimis liability for these platforms promotes infringing platforms to the detriment of responsible ones. Increasing the risk of liability for infringement results in a "separating equilibrium," with one platform offering only legitimate and high-value content and another offering a combination of illegitimate and low-value content. Effective platform liability should ultimately change the structure of the platform industry, which We believe should improve enforcement of copyright law. Legal changes similar to those prescribed here were recently been proposed in the European Union.
Disciplines
Communications Law | Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law | Intellectual Property Law | Law | Science and Technology Law
Recommended Citation
T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford & Michael Stern,
Safe Harbors and the Evolution of Online Platform Markets: An Economic Analysis,
36
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J.
309
(2018).
Available at:
https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/cardozoaelj/vol36/iss2/2
Included in
Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons