Publication Date
1991
Journal
Wisconsin Law Review
Abstract
In this article, Professor Sterk and Ms. Goldman examine the efficacy of constitutional debt limitations as a method of controlling the incurrence of public debt. In examining the historical development of such limitations, the authors conclude that they are responses to perceived deficiencies in the legislative process rather than reactions to specific instances of legislative abuse. The authors determine, however, that courts have transformed absolute constraints on legislative power to incur debt into more flexible limitations that leave the judiciary with a substantial role in determining the fate of proposed borrowing schemes. Moreover, the authors found that few states revised their constitutions in response to these transformative judicial decisions. These results lead the authors to conclude that debt limitations, even if not rigidly enforced, provide a modest constraint on the legislative bias toward present spending and future payment.
Volume
1991
Issue
6
First Page
1301
Last Page
1368
Publisher
University of Wisconsin Law School
Keywords
Debts, Constitutions, Government
Disciplines
Constitutional Law | Law
Recommended Citation
Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S. Goldman,
Controlling Legislative Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt Limitations,
1991
Wis. L. Rev.
1301
(1991).
https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/830
