In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies

Authors

Myriam E. Gilles, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of LawFollow

Publication Date

Spring 2001

Journal

Georgia Law Review

Abstract

Legal economists are concerned with setting optimal deterrence levels. Armed with information concerning the public and private costs and benefits of a particular harmful activity, the legal economist seeks to set a “price” for the activity which, to some socially optimal extent, minimizes external costs while retaining external benefits. If the economist's information is perfect, he can predict precisely how an economically rational actor will respond to a particular price and achieve optimal deterrence of activities whose costs outweigh their benefits.

Volume

35

Issue

3

First Page

845

Last Page

880

Publisher

University of Georgia School of Law

Keywords

Government (General), Remedies, Torts, Constitutional Law

Disciplines

Constitutional Law | Law | Legal Remedies | Torts

Comments

Symposium: Re-Examining First Principles: Deterrence and Corrective Justice in Constitutional Torts

Recommended Citation

Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 Ga. L. Rev. 845 (2001).
https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/612