Publication Date
Spring 2001
Journal
Georgia Law Review
Abstract
Legal economists are concerned with setting optimal deterrence levels. Armed with information concerning the public and private costs and benefits of a particular harmful activity, the legal economist seeks to set a “price” for the activity which, to some socially optimal extent, minimizes external costs while retaining external benefits. If the economist's information is perfect, he can predict precisely how an economically rational actor will respond to a particular price and achieve optimal deterrence of activities whose costs outweigh their benefits.
Volume
35
Issue
3
First Page
845
Last Page
880
Publisher
University of Georgia School of Law
Keywords
Government (General), Remedies, Torts, Constitutional Law
Disciplines
Constitutional Law | Law | Legal Remedies | Torts
Recommended Citation
Myriam E. Gilles,
In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies,
35
Ga. L. Rev.
845
(2001).
https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/612
Included in
Constitutional Law Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, Torts Commons
Comments
Symposium: Re-Examining First Principles: Deterrence and Corrective Justice in Constitutional Torts