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Description
Legal economists are concerned with setting optimal deterrence levels. Armed with information concerning the public and private costs and benefits of a particular harmful activity, the legal economist seeks to set a “price” for the activity which, to some socially optimal extent, minimizes external costs while retaining external benefits. If the economist's information is perfect, he can predict precisely how an economically rational actor will respond to a particular price and achieve optimal deterrence of activities whose costs outweigh their benefits.
Publication Date
Spring 2001
Volume
35
Publisher
Georgia Law Review
First Page
845
Disciplines
Constitutional Law | Law | Torts
Recommended Citation
Myriam E.,
In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies,
35
Georgia Law Review
845
(2001).
https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/612
Comments
Symposium: Re-Examining First Principles: Deterrence and Corrective Justice in Constitutional Torts