Title

The Antepenultimacy of the Beginning in Hegel’s Science of Logic

Authors

David G. Carlson, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of LawFollow

Files

Description

The Science of Logic is the keystone for Hegel's philosophy. Perhaps the single most perplexing problem in this work is the status of the beginning. Hegel insisted that philosophy must be self-grounding. It cannot start from "givens." Yet, if Hegel's beginning is merely stipulated or "given," then his project is defeated. The usual view of Hegel's intent is that the beginning (Pure Being) is the last step, so that what begins as a presupposition ends up being "proven." This article suggests something different. It proposes that the beginning (Pure Being) is actually the "antepenultimate" (or third-from-last) step of the Science of Logic. So conceived, the first step is a kind of collapse from the last step (absolute knowing) to the antepenultimate step. The beginning is a failure to have a coherent thought - the failure to produce an unmediated thing.

Publication Date

2004

Volume

3

Publisher

Cardozo Public Law, Policy, and Ethics Journal

First Page

225

Keywords

Georg Hegel, philosophy

Disciplines

Law

Recommended Citation

David G. Carlson, The Antepenultimacy of the Beginning in Hegel’s Science of Logic, 3 Cardozo Public Law, Policy, and Ethics Journal 225 (2004).
Available at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/21