Changing the System Without Changing the System: How the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact Would Leave Non-Compacting States Without a Leg to Stand On
This Note will discuss the constitutional and legal implications of the NPVIC, and will explore the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments both for and against its implementation. It will argue that the NPVIC is constitutional, despite many opponents’ views that it is not, because it does not encroach on federal supremacy or threaten the political relevance or rights of non-compacting states. This Note proposes that if a lawsuit between the states resulted from the enactment of the NPVIC, even if the merits of the claim are constitutional, the United States Supreme Court should dismiss these cases because the states bringing the suit would not have standing. Finally, this Note concludes that since congressional approval is not required, and if a non-compacting state were to bring suit once the NPVIC goes into effect it would not have Article III or prudential standing, there is virtually nothing stopping the NPVIC’s enactment in a state.
Cardozo Law Review de·novo
Robbins, Jillian, "Changing the System Without Changing the System: How the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact Would Leave Non-Compacting States Without a Leg to Stand On" (2017). Cardozo Law Review de•novo. 48.