Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments

Authors

Thomas W. Merrill, Northwestern University School of Law

Abstract

To what extent does the executive branch have autonomous powers of legal interpretation? The issue is often broadly framed in terms of two disparate understandings of the allocation of interpretative power: "judicial supremacy" and "departmentalism." In this paper, I shall speak of two different understandings of judicial opinions: the idea that judicial opinions (or at least the "holdings" of opinions) are legally binding on actors in the executive branch, and the idea that opinions are, from the perspective of executive actors, merely explanations for judicial judgments. I adopt this locution because it focuses more precisely on the core of the controversy over autonomy in executive interpretation. Most persons. agree that the executive branch has an obligation to enforce valid final judgments rendered by the judiciary. What has been, and remains, controversial is whether the executive is bound to follow the understanding of law set forth in judicial opinions in future controversies involving persons not party to a judicial judgment. Consequently, in order to determine whether the executive has autonomous powers of interpretation, it is necessary to examine the nature of the executive obligation to the understanding of law set forth in judicial opinions.

Keywords

Judges, Civil Rights, Courts, Legal Education

Disciplines

Civil Rights and Discrimination | Courts | Judges | Law | Legal Education

Recommended Citation

Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 43 (1993).
Available at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/clr/vol15/iss1/13