Publication Date

Spring 2001

Journal

Georgia Law Review

Abstract

Legal economists are concerned with setting optimal deterrence levels. Armed with information concerning the public and private costs and benefits of a particular harmful activity, the legal economist seeks to set a “price” for the activity which, to some socially optimal extent, minimizes external costs while retaining external benefits. If the economist's information is perfect, he can predict precisely how an economically rational actor will respond to a particular price and achieve optimal deterrence of activities whose costs outweigh their benefits.

Volume

35

First Page

845

Publisher

University of Georgia School of Law

Disciplines

Constitutional Law | Law | Torts

Comments

Symposium: Re-Examining First Principles: Deterrence and Corrective Justice in Constitutional Torts

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