Case Number
CrimFH 8613/96
Date Decided
11-27-2000
Decision Type
Appellate
Document Type
Full Opinion
Abstract
Facts: A further hearing on the judgment of the Supreme Court in CrimA 4147/95 Muhammad Yousef Jabarin v. State of Israel in which the appellant was convicted of an offense under section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance 5798-1948 for an article he had published. This further hearing addresses the question whether the construction of section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance requires a causal connection between the publication of the words of praise, sympathy, or encouragement and the risk of the occurrence of acts of violence pursuant to the publication, for a conviction. The court further addresses the question whether section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance relates only to “acts of violence” of a terrorist organization or to any “acts of violence”.
Held: The Court held in an opinion by Justice T. Or that section 4(a) relates to acts of violence of a terrorist organizations and the words of praise and encouragement relate to acts of violence of a terrorist organization. Justice Or further held that the words and praise and encouragement in the publication which was the subject of the conviction do not constitute acts of violence of a terrorist organization. Therefore, the Court held that the defendant was to be acquitted of the offense under section 4(a) of the Ordinance.
Justice Y. Kedmi in a separate opinion was of the view that the further hearing should have been denied. Justice Kedmi agreed with the construction given to section 4(a) in the Elba case [2], as it was adopted by the Justices in the panel in the first hearing of this matter. Justice Kedmi was therefore of the opinion that the appellant’s conviction should have been upheld. Justice Kedmi further stated that even according to the narrower construction of section 4(a), the appellant’s conviction should have been upheld as the actions for which the appellant showed support, also meet the requirements of section 4(a) when narrowly construed.
Vice-President S. Levin in a separate opinion stated his general agreement with Justice Or and disagreed that section 4(a) is to be interpreted as referring to “acts of violence” of a terrorist organization alone, but rather should include the type of violent activity that characterizes terrorist organizations. In his view the appellant’s article satisfied this definition and therefore the conviction should have been upheld.
Justice E. Mazza in a separate opinion was of the view that the appellant’s conviction should have been upheld and referenced his judgments in CrimA 2831/95 Elba v. State of Israel and in CrimA 4147/95 Jabarin v. State of Israel which was the subject of the further hearing.
Keywords
Administrative Law -- Discretion, Administrative Law -- Judicial review, Constitutional Law -- Freedom of Expression, Constitutional Law -- State of Emergency and National Security
Recommended Citation
Or, Theodor; Barak, Aharon; Dorner, Dalia; Turkel, Jacob; Levin, Dov; Kedmi, Yaakov; and Mazza, Eliahu, "State of Israel v. Jabarin" (2000). Translated Opinions. 363.
https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/iscp-opinions/363
