Case Number
CA 9796/03
Date Decided
2-21-2005
Decision Type
Appellate
Document Type
Full Opinion
Abstract
Facts: Over a period of two weeks, the appellants deposited a total of approximately 390,000 dollars into their bank account. They did this by means of ten separate deposits on ten different days, and each individual deposit was slightly less than the amount which at that time required reporting under the Prohibition of Money Laundering Law, 5760-2000 (‘the law’). Since the appellants lived abroad, the respondent applied in a civil proceeding to the District Court for forfeiture of the amount deposited. Under s. 22 of the law, forfeiture in a civil proceeding requires the state to prove that an offence was committed with the money whose forfeiture is requested. In this case, the state argued that the splitting of the total amount deposited into smaller sums that were slightly less than the amount requiring reporting constituted an attempt to evade the reporting requirements under the law, which is in itself an offence under s. 7(b) of the law. The District Court ordered the forfeiture of a sum of 150,000 dollars out of the total amount deposited. The appellants appealed. They argued that the offence of evading reporting under s. 3(b) of the law referred only to ‘prohibited money’ as defined in s. 3(a) of the law, and the state had not proved that the money concerned was ‘prohibited money.’ They also argued that the state’s burden of proof in a civil forfeiture proceeding under s. 22 is the criminal burden of proof (beyond all reasonable doubt) rather than the civil burden of proof (on a balance of probabilities).
Held: The offence of evading reporting under s. 3(b) refers to all money, and not merely ‘prohibited money.’ The method of evading the reporting duty, which is known as structuring, gives rise to a strong suspicion of an offence under s. 3(b) of the law, unless the person making the deposits can give an innocent explanation for the structuring of the deposits. With regard to the state’s burden of proof under s. 22 of the law, Vice-President Cheshin and Justice Naor held that the burden of proof is the one required in a civil trial, although there is a need for more substantial and weighty evidence than what is required in a normal civil trial. Justice Hayut sought to leave the question of the burden of proof undecided, since in the circumstances of the case the state had discharged even the criminal burden of proof. The structured nature of the deposits gave rise to a very serious suspicion that the appellants intended to evade reporting by their actions, and the fact that the appellants had given no explanation of their actions meant that the state had succeeded in proving that an offence of evading reporting had been committed. Appeal denied.
Keywords
Criminal Law -- Offenses
