Case Number
HCJ 3292/07
Date Decided
12-8-2011
Decision Type
Original
Document Type
Full Opinion
Abstract
Facts: In 2004, following a series of murderous terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians in 2004, as well as continual rocket launches against Israeli civilian targets, the Israel Defense Forces conducted two military campaigns in the Gaza Strip – Operation Rainbow (May, 2004) and Operation Days of Repentance (September-October, 2004). More than a year after the end of the second campaign, Adalah – Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights (petitioner 1) requested of the Attorney General and the Military Advocate General (respondents 1 and 2) that criminal investigations be opened in the matter of Operation Rainbow, due to the civilian casualties and the destruction of homes that had occurred in the course of its conduct. The request was denied by the Military Advocate General. The request was repeated and again denied; the third request, in January 2007 – more than two years after the end of hostilities – included a demand to open a criminal investigation in the matter of Operation Days of Repentance as well. The petitioners claimed, based primarily on newspaper reports surveying the situation in the Gaza Strip after the operations, as well as on reports by international organizations and statements by international bodies criticizing the Israeli actions, that the extensive damage necessarily indicated criminal violations of human rights such as the rights to life and bodily integrity, as well as violations of International law relating to treatment and protection of civilians and civilian structures in times of war. The Military Advocate General again declined to open criminal investigations, and in April, 2007, this petition was filed, asking that the Attorney General and Military Advocate General show cause why a criminal investigation should not be opened for the purpose of prosecuting those responsible for the civilian casualties and damage that resulted from the operations.
Held: The generality of the petition, in that it did not specify individual cases in which criminal offenses were allegedly committed, but rather referred to the damage, per se, to civilians and civilian objectives in the course of the two operations, was to its detriment: the High Court of Justice ruled in the past that it cannot adjudicate a petition tainted by generality in the definition of the dispute, in the factual basis that it lays and in the requested relief. No proof was offered here of invalid, unlawful motives for launching the operations – on the contrary, the respondents argued for a right of self-defense and that it was their duty to defend the citizens of Israel. The determination that there was a security need put the actions in the realm of security policy, within the clear discretion of the security authorities and not justiciable by the High Court.
A demand to conduct a criminal investigation must be supported by a suitable prima facie foundation, answering to the provisions of the domestic penal laws. In cases in which the laws of war have been violated, charges will be filed pursuant to Israeli domestic law for the appropriate criminal offense, the principles of which, as a rule, parallel the principles of international criminal law. The opening of a criminal investigation is not an automatic process in every case in which there is a grave outcome, such as the deaths of civilians and wide-spread destruction of houses. It must arise from a real suspicion that criminal violations were, indeed, committed. An investigation of that type must be conducted when a prima facie suspicion arises of conduct that deviates from Israeli law or of serious violations of international law that amount to criminal offenses under the domestic penal laws. In view of the absence of such a suspicion and of the required evidentiary foundation, the criminal law is not the appropriate tool for investigating issues such as the subject of the petition. Other means of investigation and review may exist, such as commissions of inquiry; as a rule, the discretion granted to the investigative and prosecutorial bodies with regard to the establishment of a commission of examination or inquiry in general, and with regard to the selection of a particular type of examination mechanism in particular, is extremely broad, and judicial review of a decision of that type is limited and restricted to an examination of the feasibility of the choice.
The “principle of distinction”, which imposes on the fighting army an obligation to refrain from intentionally harming the civilian population, is a basic principle of the laws of war that govern armed conflicts between Israeli security forces and the terrorist organizations that control the Gaza Strip. However, the laws of war also recognize the existence of “collateral damage” – damage caused to civilians indirectly, as a result of an attack aimed at the military targets of the enemy – and such damage does not constitute a violation of the laws of war, even if it is foreseeable, provided that it meets the requirements of the law, among which are the proportionality of the anticipated harm that would be caused to the civilians vis-à-vis the benefit anticipated from the military action, and refraining from deliberate attacks on civilians. Therefore, the fact that citizens were harmed is not sufficient to establish a real suspicion that criminal offenses were committed in violation of the laws of war.
Regarding one particular incident described in the petition, in which civilians were killed as a result of artillery fire at an abandoned house towards which a procession of Palestinian civilians was moving, the Court did not find cause to intervene in the conclusion of the MAG, affirmed by the Attorney General, that the erroneous decision of the squadron commander was not unreasonable to the point of justifying the conduct of criminal proceedings against him.
The extensive delay in filing the petition also militated against granting the sought relief: here, not only did the delay imply a waiver of the right to apply to the courts (subjective delay), but changes had occurred in the actual situation on the ground, making it difficult to establish what actually happened (objective delay). Even though the Court accepted that as a rule, the claim of delay should not be allowed when the rule of law and the violation of human rights is at stake, nevertheless it held that in the present case, the delay actually negated the ability to address the petition, and there was no longer any point to it.
In short, the sweeping petition and the serious claims made therein did not lay a proper factual or legal foundation for a practical and concrete deliberation. The petition mixed legal claims and claims that belong in the arena of public discourse, and not in a legal proceeding. The petition was denied.
Keywords
Constitutional Law -- Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, Constitutional Law -- Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, Constitutional Law -- Property Rights
Recommended Citation
Beinisch, Dorit; Rubinstein, Elyakim; and Melcer, Hanan, "Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Attorney General" (2011). Translated Opinions. 24.
https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/iscp-opinions/24