Publication Date
1997
Journal
Harvard Negotiation Law Review
Abstract
In the inaugural issue of the Harvard Negotiation Law Review, Professors David Croson and Robert Mnookin attempt a game-theoretic defense of the nonrefundable retainer. A nonrefundable retainer is an attorney fee arrangement that requires a client to pay her lawyer a specified dollar amount in advance and entitles the lawyer to keep the fee even if he does no work. For nearly a decade, we have argued that nonrefundable retainers are unethical as a matter of professional responsibility and unenforceable as a matter of law. In the last few years, numerous courts have evaluated the enforceability of these agreements, choosing to ban these fee devices on ethical and legal grounds. Scholars of ethics have participated in a robust debate concerning nonrefundable retainers and have appraised the benefits and burdens that such fee arrangements pose. Yet, Croson and Mnookin assert that none of the "attacks" on nonrefundable retainers "have considered the beneficial strategic effects."
Volume
2
First Page
69
Last Page
86
Publisher
Harvard Law School
Keywords
Money, Professional Ethics in Law, Legal Profession, Remedies
Disciplines
Law | Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility | Legal Profession | Legal Remedies
Recommended Citation
Lester Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Game Theory and Nonrefundable Retainers: A Response to Professors Croson and Mnookin,
2
Harv. Negot. L. Rev.
69
(1997).
https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/1169
Included in
Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, Legal Profession Commons, Legal Remedies Commons