Cardozo Law Review
Abstract
Habermas determines the role and legitimacy of constitutional adjudication through three confrontations. First, he confronts both the liberal and the welfare-state paradigms of law, seeing constitutional adjudication move from the former to the latter. Habermas wants this move to arrive at a procedural paradigm of law. Second, he confronts a norm- and a value-oriented understanding of the constitution. Habermas indicates the dangers of the former and the merits of the latter, and attempts to show that principles, understood as norms, should guide constitutional adjudication. Third, he confronts the liberal and the republican views of the political and constitutional process, developing the republican view into a procedural one. Finally, Habermas determines the role and legitimacy of constitutional adjudication-to watch over the democratic process and to "implement[ ] ... democratic procedure and the deliberative form of political opinion- and will-formation."
Keywords
Courts, European Communities, International Agencies, Jurisdiction, Human Rights Law, Business and the Law, Constitutional Law, Domestic Relations, Jurisprudence, Sexuality and the Law
Disciplines
Constitutional Law | Courts | Human Rights Law | Jurisprudence | Law | Sexuality and the Law
Recommended Citation
Bernhard Schlink,
The Dynamics of Constitutional Adjudication,
17
Cardozo L. Rev.
1231
(1996).
Available at:
https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/clr/vol17/iss4/21
Included in
Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Sexuality and the Law Commons